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When examining the technologies associated with information in
its many forms, America has truly been blessed—or cursed, depend-
ing on your point of view—with an abundance of energy and inven-
tiveness.  Through the genius of Bell and Edison, and more recently,
the products of RCA, Bell Laboratories, Microsoft, Intel and others,
America has consistently held the lead in the invention and applica-
tion of information technology.  The practical advantages of this posi-
tion have been frequent, numerous and profound.  At present,
American-designed and manufactured microprocessors, the sub-
atomic particles of computer technology, dominate the global mar-
ket, at a time when virtually every aspect of life on Earth is hurtling
headlong toward expression in informational form.  Beyond that, the
operating systems and software applications—the rules that cause
things to actually happen inside computers—are also totally domi-
nated not just by the ubiquitous Microsoft Corporation,1 but by
America as a whole.
II.  EARLY DAYS
It was inevitable that at some point or another, someone would
attempt to link this condition of technological leadership to a larger
strategy.  America’s commanding lead in basic technologies and the
associated industrial base, added to the appeal of gadgets to many
* Captain Gravell's career-long focus has been on governmental activities related to
information exploitation, protection, and attack.  He was selected to create and serve as the
first Chief of the Joint Staff Information Warfare/Assurance Division from 1994 to 1997 and
recently completed his assignment as the Special Assistant for Information Policy and Strategy
on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel.  Captain Gravell retired from
the Navy earlier this year.  The views expressed in this Article are strictly those of the author
and do not reflect official or policy positions of the federal government or of the Departments
of Defense or the Navy.
1. See David Rothkopf, In Praise of Cultural Imperialism? (Effects of Globalization and
Culture), FOR. POL’Y., Jun. 22, 1997, at 38.
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Americans, combined with opportunities created by global trends in
adoption of information-based products and services.  This alignment
of forces created a situation that scholars and futurists came to
describe as Information Warfare, or IW.2  The official and unofficial
definitions of IW and its many offspring and relatives are legion, and
appear to change daily—I refuse to add to the confusion by citing any
of them.  For my purposes here, I suggest that a simple way to ap-
proach IW would be to view “information” and associated technolo-
gies as tools of great importance and power.  We should strive to en-
hance and protect them when they are used by us and our friends; we
should seek to attack and degrade them when used by our oppo-
nents.3
The Department of Defense quickly recognized the power of in-
formation.4  After internal study and debate, concepts began to visi-
bly take shape, especially within the Joint Staff.5  By 1995, informa-
tion was judged to hold a “first among equals” status alongside other
critical processes and capabilities.  The term “information superior-
ity” was coined, and characterized as the lens through which all other
critical military processes and capabilities are derived, preserved and
executed.6 Within the military, this characterization resulted from a
logical progression from processes and experiences that had been un-
derstood and practiced for some time prior to this.7
Although it is impossible to cite a single, specific event as the
catalyst, most authorities agree that serious efforts to broadly address
the protective and defensive aspects of IW within the United States
(including their potential effects on non-combatant bystanders) date
from about 1994.  The qualification of the foregoing sentence is im-
portant.  Notwithstanding the earlier military efforts focused on the
conduct of classic, and primarily offensive, operations, only in 1994
did we see the beginning of processes with extensive organizational
2. See THE FIRST INFORMATION WAR, at ix-xi (Alan D. Campen ed., 1992).
3. This is usually reflected in the many definitions of IW as some variation on offense vs.
defense.  At the very end of this article, I will cast these terms in a somewhat different light–
one that may be more appropriate for discussions of strategy.
4. See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INFORMATION WARFARE: A STRATEGY FOR PEACE
(1996).
5. See generally THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INFORMATION WARFARE: LEGAL,
REGULATORY, POLICY AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ASSURANCE (2d ed.
1995).
6. See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT VISION 2010, at 16-19 (1995).
7. See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE, Memoran-
dum of Policy No. 30, 2-3 (1993).
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participation outside the military, designed to systematically under-
stand and respond to the effects of the Information Age on America.8
III.  A BRIEF ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY OF
INFORMATION
A Golden Age of IW intellectualization began in 1994.  Confer-
ences and symposia too numerous to list were hosted by all who
wanted to understand, thought they already did and wanted to con-
vince others, or saw a chance to make a buck off the latest craze.  Re-
spected bodies such as the Defense Science Board were commis-
sioned to produce major studies in the field.9  The National Defense
University, the leading academic body of the U.S. defense establish-
ment, created a yearlong graduate School of Information Warfare
and Strategy.10  In a prescient observation made in association with
the inauguration of that effort, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff predicted that the new school would focus on the information
component of national power.11
Inside the Joint Staff, a new organization, the Information War-
fare Division (J6K), was created inside the directorate responsible for
telecommunications and related technologies.12  J6K quickly assumed
responsibility for all Joint Staff efforts related to Defensive aspects of
IW.13  Its first goal was to work toward a broadly based and rigorous
understanding of military forces’ dependency on information.  From
that vantage point, it sought to better ensure that the informational
“goods and services” required for the conduct of military operations
would be available when, where, and in the forms needed.14
These defensive aspects of IW soon became more specifically re-
ferred to as “Information Assurance.”  This is an important devel-
opment in the history of these processes.  This subtle change indi-
cates that it may be possible to recharacterize all offensive measures
associated with information as a form of state activity, ranging from
minor coercion to warfare (due to the tools, practitioners and pur-
8. See generally THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 5.
9. See OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION &
TECHNOLOGY, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON INFORMATION
WARFARE-DEFENSE 1 (1996) [hereinafter OUSD A&T].
10. See NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, SCHOOL OF INFORMATION WARFARE AND
STRATEGY, STUDENT HANDBOOK 1 (1996-97).
11. Id.
12. See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 5, at app. A-15.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 1-1.
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poses with and for which it may be employed).15  As such, to the ex-
tent that offensive informational activities are considered necessary
or useful to facilitate achieving a desired outcome in support of mili-
tary or other governmental operations, the responsibility for these ac-
tivities is exclusively governmental.16  In contrast, the persons, proc-
esses, and, above all, equities of information protection exist far
beyond the outer boundaries of the domain of “warfare,” or the
scope of government authority.17  To characterize information-
protection efforts as being inherently associated with the conduct of
“warfare” is to instantly flavor the processes and purposes improp-
erly, and in a way that places them in a cultural and legal position
that handicaps useful collaboration between government, writ large,
and the commercial sector.  I will show later on how that becomes a
defining and pacing feature in my discussion.
Elsewhere inside the Department of Defense, efforts of the In-
formation Systems Security Office, under the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence,
picked up speed.18  Military services strove to understand the poten-
tial of IW and adapt it to their traditional strengths and cultures.  The
National Security Agency, with responsibility for protection of classi-
fied (but not unclassified) government communications,19 continued
to expanded its outreach efforts across a broad front.20  Among those
organizations approached was one of the few at the time with a built-
in charter for coordination and information sharing across the gov-
ernment-civil interface, the National Communications System and its
executive body, the National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee (NSTAC).21  The NSTAC Principals, a group of the Chief
Executive Officers of some of the nation’s leading telecommunica-
tions and information-technology corporations, were sufficiently con-
cerned about the implications for the “integrity of the nation’s infor-
mation systems, both governmental and public,” that they sent a
15. See generally WALTER GARY SHARP, SR., CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE
(1999).
16. See id.
17. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS – PROTECTING AMERICA’S INFRASTRUCTURE, at ix-xi (1997).
18. See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 5, at app. A-7 to A-8.
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3 (1994).
20. See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 5.
21. See THE PRESIDENT’S NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY
COMMITTEE INFORMATION ASSURANCE TASK FORCE, ELECTRIC POWER INFORMATION
ASSURANCE RISK ASSESSMENT 1 (1997) [hereinafter NSTAC].
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letter to the President in March 1995.22  NSTAC has continued its
good works to date, but within some limits.23  However valuable
NSTAC has been as a model of government-civil coordination, its
charter is bounded in ways suggested by its name.24  In its focus on
commercial telecommunications and closely related industries in
support of specified national security applications, NSTAC was only
a partial solution to a much larger problem.  Something else was
needed.
IV.  THE GOVERNMENT-CIVIL INTERFACE TAKES FORM
From the beginning, the most consistent findings from the many
IW studies and analytic efforts pointed to the profound vulnerability
of commercial, privately owned and operated information infrastruc-
tures to serious disruption in the performance of critical functions.25
At the same time, it became obvious that government operations,
from the mundane to the most critical, were dependent upon those
same civil information infrastructure processes.26  This pair of linked
conclusions shaped further issue development, both within the gov-
ernment,27 and among the infrastructures themselves.28
At this point, one axis of the government’s growing interest in,
and concern for, information began to focus on these civil informa-
tion infrastructures specifically.29  The President’s Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) was created by Executive
Order.30 The Commission organized its treatment of the infrastruc-
tures into several categories: telecommunications, banking and fi-
nance, electric power, oil and gas distribution, transportation, water
systems and emergency services.31  In due course, the Commission
produced its report, reiterating the findings of earlier studies regard-
ing the dependency of both critical public and private processes on
22. Id.
23. See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 5, at 2-22 to 2-24.
24. See Exec. Order No. 12,382, 47 Fed. Reg. 40,531, 40,531 (1982).
25. See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 5, at 1-1.
26. See generally id.
27. See OUSD A&T, supra note 9, at ES-1.
28. See NSTAC, supra note 21, at ES-2.
29. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
supra note 17, at ix-xi.
30. See generally Exec. Order No. 13010, 61 Fed. Reg. 37,347 (1996).
31. See id.
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information and the vulnerability of these commercial cartels,32 and
providing several recommendations.
After a period of review and staffing of the Commission’s report,
the Clinton administration framed its response to Information Age
threats.  Interestingly, it produced not one document, but two, re-
leasing them on the same date.  The first of these, Presidential Deci-
sion Directive 62,33 related to methods of countering the terrorist
threat.34  The second, and the primary focus of my attention here, was
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD 63), Critical Infrastructure
Protection.35  This approach is interesting because it appears to draw
a procedural and organizational line between highly similar proc-
esses, in which the underlying equities with both charter and capacity
to respond to the problem are totally governmental on one side
(counter-terrorism), and primarily civil on the other.  PDD 63 split
these processes into parallel but separate regimes in spite of the
growing awareness in government circles of the convergence between
terrorism and information-attack.36
PDD 63 emphasizes information sharing, both within govern-
ment and between government and the private sector.37  Most of the
directed actions relate to the creation of organizational structures de-
signed to mitigate the vulnerability of information infrastructures,
and to promote their rapid restoration to full effectiveness after a de-
grading incident. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was es-
tablished as a focal point for these activities, especially for the collec-
tion and dissemination of incident and threat warning.38
32. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
supra note 17, at ix-xi.
33. See Presidential Decision Directive 62.  (PDD 62 is classified but is described in the
White House press release “Summary of Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63,” dated
May 22, 1998, and is on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
34. See id.
35. The White House, White Paper: Presidential Decision Directive 63—Critical Infra-
structure Protection (1998) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International
Law).
36. For example, this association had been discussed a year earlier at the Defense De-
partment’s annual Worldwide Antiterrorism Conference, held in San Antonio, TX (August 18-
22, 1997), and also addressed in a letter from H. Allen Holmes, the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, to the author (Nov. 3, 1997) (on file
with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
37. See The White House, supra note 35, at 2-3.
38. See id. at 9.
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V.  THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT
Having completed a rapid historical review, I have caught up to
the present.  The various actions assigned by PDD 63 are nearing
completion.  The FBI has set up the National Infrastructure Protec-
tion Center (NIPC) to “serve as a national critical infrastructure
threat assessment, warning, vulnerability and law enforcement inves-
tigation and response entity.”39  This law enforcement investigation
and response entity serves as the point of departure for the next as-
pect of the discussion.
At this juncture, if one were to ask, “why are we doing this?,”
the answer seems obvious, based on the discussion to this point: to
ensure the efficient performance of critical public and private func-
tions (and thereby to protect lives and property), and to promote
economic health and prosperity.40
A second question relates to the scope and bounds of the effort
associated with the vitally needed function of infrastructure protec-
tion.  What are those bounds?  The short answer is that there are
none.41  The problem is global in size and unfixed in shape.42  The
condition of vulnerability is permanent, in that even if perfect protec-
tion could be achieved (which it almost certainly cannot), it would
have to be maintained through constant vigilance, at all organiza-
tional levels, from top to bottom.43  Who is competent and trusted, by
all parties to the process, to perform these vital functions?
In terms of the mechanical performance of the role, what are the
required inputs?  The internal process considerations?  The outputs?
Bear in mind, these answers must be framed in several dimensions
(e.g., not only the type of information required, but the granularity,
periodicity, and specificity).
The real question is: can any single actor or agent do this?  Na-
tional information-protection initiatives seek to protect the domestic
economy.44  However, the clear trend is toward economic globaliza-
tion, such that domestic and international domains are increasingly
39. Id. (emphasis added).
40. Is it not also possible to characterize these goals as expressions of our “vital national
interests”?
41. See CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, CYBERCRIME, CY-
BERTERRORISM, CYBERWARFARE: AVERTING AN ELECTRONIC WATERLOO xvi (1998).
42. See id.
43. See id. at xvi-xviii.
44. See OUSD A&T, supra note 9, at ES-2.
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indivisible.45  Just as the various “bad actors” have the ability to proj-
ect their effects to or from any spot on the globe,46 so it is highly likely
that any attack on critical domestic infrastructures that affects eco-
nomic performance will resonate globally.47  From this globalization,
we can see the development of information warfare from its concep-
tual beginnings as a nice, tidy matter of domestic law enforcement,
into something that must, over time, be drawn inexorably into the
realms of international security and management of the global econ-
omy.  Placing the shoe on the other foot, the military recognized
early in its thinking about information that even though forces may
be operating in some distant area of the world, the tail of reach-back
support associated with those activities extends into these same do-
mestic, commercial networks.48  As such, the conduct of foreign pol-
icy and military operations on the global scene immediately and nec-
essarily engages domestic interests and equities.49
Governmental organizations which must think about the terror-
ist threat, and which have traditionally been prone to seek and en-
gage that threat overseas, are increasingly aware of the vulnerabilities
of domestic infrastructures, and of the opportunities available to
malefactors to access these “soft targets” via global information net-
works.50  The theme has also been picked up within the realms of
criminal justice and academia.51  Knowledge of these vulnerabilities
stands as further evidence of how difficult it will be to neatly segre-
gate domestic and international issues in this field, notwithstanding
the fact that the charters of federal organizations are split largely
along those territorial lines.52
45. See Center for Strategic and International Studies, New Global Economy Project,
(visited Feb. 13, 1999) <http://www.csis.org/nge/>.
46. See Barry C. Collin, The Future of Cyberterrorism: Where the Physical and Virtual
Worlds Converge, in TERRORISM AND THE NEW WORLD DISORDER 3 (Office of International
Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago ed., 1997).
47. See OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, CYBERNATION: THE AMERICAN INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE INFORMATION AGE
27-29 (1997); THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 4, at 2.
48. See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 4, at 3.
49. See id. at 2.
50. See William Gravell, Information Warfare and Terrorism: Changing the Rules (Briefing
to the Worldwide Antiterrorism Conference, San Antonio, TX, Aug. 19, 1997).
51. See generally Collin, supra note 46.
52. See The White House, supra note 35, at 8-9.  For example, the Department of Justice
and the FBI are responsible for law enforcement and internal security while the CIA, the De-
partment of State, and the Department of Defense are responsible for intelligence, foreign af-
fairs, and national defense, respectively, with regard to information warfare.  See id.
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Domestic law enforcement must be seen as one among many
centers of organizational concern, and of skill, training and experi-
ence, in dealing with the set of problems emerging in the Information
Age.53  Just as the information networks at the center of the issue re-
spect no boundaries of jurisdiction, culture or organizational demar-
cation, the nation’s solution must be able to elegantly draw upon the
whole range of human skills and organizational capabilities.54  In their
quite proper emphasis on information sharing, the members of the
PCCIP clearly had this in mind. 55  Indeed, if one is constrained to
meet the need by choosing one of the existing governmental bureauc-
racies, the decisions reflected in PDD 63 can hardly be faulted.56  In
fairness, PDD 63 may be considered the best approach to get some
capability online quickly that was available at the time.  The larger
question we should now be focused on, however, is whether that ap-
proach—staying “in the lanes” of the historic organization of the fed-
eral government—best meets the nation’s needs in the long term.
VI.  THE FRIENDLY NEIGHBORHOOD INFORMATION COP
As noted above, PDD 63 assigned to the FBI (through the
NIPC) significant responsibilities for information-attack threat col-
lection and dissemination, while (naturally) preserving the parent or-
ganization’s traditional investigative roles.57  There is evidence that
this duality is causing concern among at least some of the domestic
information stakeholders, without whose full cooperation any effort
to protect the National Information Infrastructure is dead on arri-
val.58
At a recent seminar strategy game jointly sponsored by a leading
consulting firm in this field, a major computer security industry asso-
ciation, and the U.S. Army War College, senior industry representa-
tives worked with government experts to identify and resolve issues
associated with a plausible information-attack scenario. 59  A civilian
53. See Collin, supra note 46, at 4.
54. See id.
55. See THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
supra note 17, at 23.
56. See id. at 6.
57. See The White House, supra note 35, at 9.
58. See CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, supra note 41, at 54-62.
59. See ROBERT F. MINEHART, THE INFORMATION ASSURANCE SEMINAR GAME 62
(1998).
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governmental expert, whose expertise centers on the commercial side
of federal operations, made the following observations:
Most critical infrastructure industry representatives regard their
reaching out to government (including federal law enforcement),
“‘as adding little or no value’ or as ‘legal problems to be avoided—
at least until the situation the company was experiencing became
clearer to the firm’s executives.’”
These lessons and the cultural problems of perceptions, attitudes,
communications and understanding are valuable.  We, as a nation,
need to change our way of thinking about traditional industry-
government relations and organize now to face the challenge of
building genuine government-industry partnerships for cyber protec-
tion of critical national infrastructures.60
At this point, it is important to remember that the Department
of Justice, and the FBI in particular, does and must perform abso-
lutely vital functions in any conceivable regime of national/domestic
information infrastructure protection.  The goal here is neither to
malign those functions nor to belittle the contributions of those or-
ganizations, but rather to demonstrate that a broader—indeed, uni-
versal—view is required.  Absent such a perspective, all scenarios
tend to be framed within the context and culture of the sin-
gle/dominant organization.
An example of this point may be found in the National Informa-
tion Infrastructure Act of 1996 (NII).61  The Act “raises the bar” on
criminalization of information attack in several ways.62  Notably, this
includes new protections for several categories of “information from
any protected computer.”63  The term “protected computer” is fur-
ther defined in the Act to include a computer “which is used in inter-
state or foreign commerce or communications.”64  It is hard to imag-
ine any internet-accessible computer which would not satisfy this
definition.  As such, the Act does an excellent job of providing for a
broad range of criminal and civil penalties in response to many kinds
of unauthorized information penetration, destruction, commercial
exploitation, or communication of information to unauthorized re-
cipients.  Its authors and sponsors are to be commended for patching
this gaping hole in the domestic legal structure.  However, the legal
structure lacks a counterpart understanding of the adjacent equities.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. 18 U.S.C.A § 1030 (West Supp. 1999).
62. See id.
63. 18 U.S.C.A § 1030 (a)(2)(C).
64. 18 U.S.C.A § 1030 (e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
GRAVELL.DOC 09/09/99  9:39 AM
1999] SOME OBSERVATIONS ALONG THE ROAD 411
One example of these organizationally adjacent and parallel
concerns is found in national security responses involving intelligence
or Defense Department capabilities.  The default outcome of the cur-
rent structure is that all incident responses are managed at the outset
within a domestic law enforcement paradigm.65  This leaves the law
enforcement community with a clear and actionable charter to treat
every incident as within their jurisdiction.66  However, in so doing, the
structure includes law enforcement officers whose experience and
training might leave them ill-suited to provide appropriate and timely
organizational responses that meet the nation’s most pressing needs.
This latter point highlights the issue.  It is virtually axiomatic
that whatever else any given information attack may betoken, it is
against the law.  As such, the prospect of a proper law enforcement
investigation, leading to the arrest, trial, and conviction of a criminal,
hangs over every incident from the outset.  This paradigm is likely to
coexist with competing interests.  Each interest is completely legiti-
mate in its own way, whether it amounts to broadcasting warnings to
a broad audience, maintaining secrecy for purposes of intelligence
exploitation, or using the information to support planning for military
operations.67  At the risk of appearing facetious, one might contem-
plate a Cold War parallel where the planned response to the threat of
Soviet bombers attacking the United States would be to bring
Wrongful Death actions against the Soviet pilots in American
courts.68
In fairness, it must be pointed out that PDD 63 anticipates that
law enforcement interests may need to be subordinated to those of
larger national security under unspecified circumstances,
“[d]epending on the nature and level of a foreign threat/attack.”69
However, at least to date, these procedures have not always worked
smoothly.  There are reasons to believe that this is cause for concern.
With the National Defense Authorization Act of 1996, Congress rec-
ognized the threat of “strategic attack by foreign nations, groups or
65. See CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, supra note 41, at 57; The
White House, supra note 35, at 10.  See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
66. See The White House, supra note 35, at 9-10; CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND IN-
TERNATIONAL STUDIES, supra note 41, at 57.
67. See THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 4, at 15-16.
68. See CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, supra note 41, at 41.
The CSIS asks specifically about the proportionality of the American response to an IW threat,
wondering if the U.S. would “nuke [an IW aggressor] because they turned off our TVs?”  Id.
69. See The White House, supra note 35, at 10.
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individuals . . . against the NII.”70  Similar concerns regarding strate-
gic attack were repeated by Congress in 199771 and also very recently
by a highly respected think tank.72  “Strategic” is emphasized to un-
derline the point that one may readily contemplate Information Age
scenarios which far exceed the response capacity of any single or-
ganization, particularly organizations with a historically domestic
emphasis.
The commercial operators of the private sector represent an-
other group of concerned players adjacent to law enforcement in
these matters.  Their motives and interests are obvious: continued
profitability, economically efficient operations, protection of trade
secrets and other intellectual property, and maintenance of a satisfied
customer base, among other things.  In pursuit of these goals, prudent
Information Age corporations closely watch their networks and in-
formation systems.  However, it has been noted that
[o]nce law enforcement is introduced to an incident such as an in-
trusion, the ‘rules of engagement’ change.  For example, once the
phone company notifies the FBI of a cyber attack, they would no
longer be able to monitor customer transactions because of the
rules of evidence.  In effect, the phone company would no longer be
able to conduct an internal investigation.73
One feature of the NIPC is that it provides the single point-of-
contact (POC), so long sought after in the world of governmental in-
formation protection.74  While a single POC may be desirable to
streamline authority and responsibility in coordination, it is unclear
whether choosing a strong, central POC from among the Industrial
Age organizational entities of the current federal governmental struc-
ture is the best solution.  In an interesting contrast to this approach,
the government has urged the commercial sector to consider using
the highly distributed Centers for Disease Control model to create of
an industry-centered Information Sharing and Analysis Center
(ISAC).75  Through its suggestion, government may be implicitly rec-
ognizing that “those who believe the solution to national information
70. The JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 5, at 2-59.
71. See id. at 2-39.
72. See CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, supra note 41, at xix.
73. MINEHART, supra note 59, at 68.
74. This passion for centralization may devolve from the strong role played in the early
days of information protection by the military, wherein “unity of command” is considered es-
sential, and in every undertaking, one can point to the person “in charge” of the entire opera-
tion.
75. See The White House, supra note 35, at 10-11.
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vulnerability can be found through declaring any one person or or-
ganization to be in charge . . . reveal only their ignorance of the com-
plexity and scope of the issues involved.”76
It may well be that the model of industrial cooperation, which
recognizes limits of authority and respects different organizational
cultures, may be instructive in this context.  As a nation, we must en-
fold highly dissimilar processes in our national approach to informa-
tion and its protection.  Statecraft, intelligence, the military, and law
enforcement comprise the classic elements of U.S. national security,
with an obviously offshore orientation.77  Our Information Age
thinking must expand that set of participants to embrace financial
and economic actors, personal health and welfare concerns, and other
equities.  Indeed, one is hard pressed to think of a national function,
either governmental or commercial, which does not have a need for
effective and protected information management.
VII.  INDICATIONS AND WARNING
Up to this point, this Article has examined, and strongly sup-
ported, the findings of all credible practitioners working in this field
regarding:
 the criticality of information and its related technologies to vir-
tually all aspects of American domestic and international security,
welfare, and prosperity;
 the vulnerability of these critical processes to many sources of
attack or disruption;
 the recognition that importance plus vulnerability indicate the
need for a serious and thoughtfully constructed strategy to preserve
and protect information, including related processes and technolo-
gies;
 the need for efficient procedures of trusted sharing and col-
laboration in pursuit of these goals, not only between government and
the private sector, but also within the government; and
 the need for adaptive organizations, created to effect this type
of trusted information sharing in the name of the common good.
76. CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, supra note 41, at 56 (quoting
William Gravell).
77. It has been asserted, however, that “the info-tech revolution is making defense, diplo-
macy, intelligence and technology indivisible.”  Paul Mann, Info Technologies Transform Na-
tional Security Doctrine, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 23, 1998, at 51.
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The discussion now turns to what it will take to put these ideas
into practice.
At the heart of this need for sharing is a process known in gov-
ernmental parlance as “Indications and Warning” (I&W).78  This ca-
pability, under various names, has been called for by virtually every
IW study conducted during the period of our review.79  Even Con-
gress has cited the need for this capability.80
A generic I&W model is shown in Figure (1).  This graphic is
provided to help depict the flow of the process as well as to highlight
the relationships between different parties in the enterprise at vari-
ous stages in the effort.81
The central questions in I&W are twofold: (1) what is to be pro-
tected and (2) against what threats do we need to protect ourselves?
That our answers to these two questions remain limited is one of the
most important unresolved aspects of our information strategy.  Un-
fortunately, as will become evident, this Achilles’ heel could mean-
ingfully hamstring efforts to achieve our much-needed I&W capabil-
ity.
If one does enjoy an adequate understanding of the answers to
these two questions, one can follow the model through a reasonable
process down the left track (intelligence/threat), leading to a final
analytic understanding, supported by evidence, of what is happening
or about to happen (indications).  One may then disseminate that
knowledge to any selected group of recipients, in the form of a
warning.
78. Purists may point out that in intelligence parlance, “I&W” refers to insights gained on
a strategic timeline regarding the development of some future threat, while terms like “Tactical
Warning and Attack Assessment” (TWAA) describe time-sensitive, reactive processes such as
those associated with information attack detection, assessment and restoration.  Nonetheless,
within the IA community, “I&W” is the term in most common use, and it will be so used here.
79. See, e.g., ROBERT H. ANDERSON & ANTHONY C. HEARN, AN EXPLORATION OF
CYBERSPACE SECURITY R&D INVESTMENT STRATEGIES FOR DARPA 9 (1996); OFFICE OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, supra note 47, at 27-29; THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
supra note 4, at 9; OUSD A&T, supra note 9, at 6-4 to 6-6.
80. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §
1053(1), 110 Stat. 186, 440-41 (1996) (directing the White House to report to Congress on the
state of national policy regarding attacks on American information infrastructure).
81. See William Gravell, National Security in the Information Age: Changing the Rules, in
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 108, 111-112,
F-4 to F-6 (Duke University School of Law Center on Law, Ethics and National Security et al.
eds., 1998).  This model was shown and discussed at a conference hosted by Duke University in
early 1998.
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It would be easy to fall into the trap of seeing the term “I&W” as
descriptive of a single unit.  Indeed, this might well be inferred from
the simple ampersand separating them.  However, to do so is to fail
to recognize that “indications” and “warning” are in fact two quite
separate processes, functioning synergistically, each drawing heavily
upon the other for its effectiveness, if not its very existence.82  Note
also the horizontal relationships of the model.  In some cases, coop-
eration between equities on each side of the central arrow is needed
to perform some required activity (for example, the placement or
functioning of sensors in optimal locations).  In other cases, one may
seek to engage stakeholders early in the process, with a goal of
heightening their awareness of the threat, thereby building support
for later cooperation.  The top-row processes on the model provide
examples of this.
The historic case of the North American Aerospace Defense
provides an exemplary illustration.  Given that the goal of the pro-
gram was preventing Soviet nuclear weapons (first delivered by
bombers, and in later years by missiles) from reaching the North
American continent in a surprise attack, the rest of the system, while
far from easy, was at least practicable.83  Understanding the physics,
time-distance factors and other variables associated with such an at-
tack permitted the engineering of a specifically-designed system of
sensors, analytic and communications capabilities; the creation of
tailored policies and standard procedures to be followed in the event
of predictable eventualities; and the establishment, a priori, of the
necessary working and authority relationships.84
The last point is particularly relevant to the discussion.  The sys-
tem is run by the North American Aerospace Defense Command
(NORAD); Canada has always been an integral partner, even though
it has never possessed nuclear weapons, and the sparsely populated
territory of northern Canada was never a likely target for Soviet mis-
siles.85  The simple fact is that the nature of the threat we were con-
fronting indicated a polar-oriented attack; thus, in order to achieve
the maximum warning time, it was highly desirable to install sensors
as far forward (that is, to the north) as possible, which meant Canada,
82. Hence the form of expression at the top of Figure (1): “Indications and Warning.”
83. See JAMES MEIKLE EGLIN, AIR DEFENSE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE 57-59, 72-75 (1988)
84. See JOSEPH T. JOCKEL, NO BOUNDARIES UPSTAIRS: CANADA, THE UNITED STATES,
AND THE ORIGINS OF NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENSE, 1945-1958, at 17-18 (1987).
85. See id. at 1, 42.
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among other places.86  In the course of negotiations creating the Dis-
tant Early Warning Line as a sensory feed to NORAD, considerable
accommodations were made to the Canadian government.87  These
concessions provided for extensive partnerships along several lines,
including commingled staffing at several levels, up to the Vice Com-
mander, who is always a Canadian.88  At the center of the relationship
is the understanding that without sensory inputs achievable only with
Canadian cooperation, attack awareness would either occur late or
not at all.89
In return for this vital contribution to the NORAD enterprise,
Canada was entitled to participate in and receive the fruits of the
analysis.90  Furthermore, the aspect of the response related to its
eradication or minimization of  the threat before the fact—in this
case, through interception by fighter aircraft—has also been a col-
laborative US/Canadian effort from the outset.91  In summary, this
case presents a coordinated, voluntary effort between two sovereigns
to construct a sensory apparatus across jurisdictional boundaries, to
collaborate in active negation of specified threats, and to share in-
formation related to the status of threats and efforts to reduce those
threats, on both strategic and tactical timelines.92
The comparison of the case above to the current discussion re-
veals important contrasts.  Recall the two overarching questions of
I&W:
What is to be protected?  If we are correct in our understanding
that the availability of timely, accurate, and uncorrupted information
is essential to national security and all other governmental processes,
then does it follow that all governmental information requires a
similar protective regime?  If the NSTAC, PCCIP and others are cor-
rect (and I think they most certainly are) regarding the extent of civil
ownership of the information infrastructures upon which not only
government, but also the health and welfare of our citizens are de-
pendent, does that indicate a similar need to protect all such com-
mercial infrastructures?  In short, absent something akin to a national
information strategy, on what basis would any public or private in-
86. See WILLIAM FRIEDMAN ET AL., ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY WARFARE 51 (1985).
87. See JOCKEL, supra note 84, at 3, 25.
88. See id.
89. See EGLIN, supra note 83, at 72-74.
90. See JOCKEL, supra note 84, at 83.
91. See id. at 2-3.
92. See id. at 91-92.
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formational product or service be culled out from the (apparently)
needed protective umbrella?  And yet we must agree that any sugges-
tion that the government should undertake to protect “everything”
can be dismissed out of hand as unmanageably large, expensive, and
difficult, to say nothing of the enormous implications for privacy and
governmental intrusion into private commerce.
Clearly, what is needed is a strategy, with some rigorous basis, to
identify and perhaps even prioritize what is to be protected.  Such a
strategy would necessarily go beyond the limits of the domestic infra-
structures discussed in PDD 63.93  It would certainly require the coor-
dination of “sensory” information from the commercial sector with
governmental intelligence and retaliatory efforts, on a basis of com-
plete and mutual trust and confidence.  For government to invite
(much less demand) that civil stakeholders provide full and unfet-
tered access to their proprietary information is unreasonable and un-
workable.  Government must first quantify, specify, and, most par-
ticularly, bound the informational need, making a reasoned and open
case to see it fulfilled.  Such an effort would require, in both creation
and operation, the support of virtually the entire economic and po-
litical leadership of the nation, as well as broad support from an in-
formed public.  It would presumably be an undertaking so broad (but
not necessarily large) that no one organization, in or out of govern-
ment, could manage it alone.  PDD 63, notwithstanding its invaluable
role in providing for “initial steps” toward meaningful civil and gov-
ernmental cooperation, falls well short of the scope of what is being
described here.
What are we protecting against?  This question must be answered
in several dimensions.  Some progress has been made in defining
“cyber attack,” as noted above.94  Similarly, there has been progress
in recasting traditional forms of economic crime, such as fraud, in in-
formational terms.95  However, when the motives and actors of such
attacks transcend the traditional scope of domestic criminal and civil
misconduct, how well prepared are we to respond as a nation?  We
do not refer here to any kind of tit-for-tat retaliation in kind, but
rather to the historic notion that an attack on the nation may precipi-
tate response by all available means, (within limits of proportionality,
93. See The White House, supra note 35, at 8.
94. See MINEHART, supra note 59, at 68.
95. See, e.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 § 2(d), 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (1994)
(creating new computer-related fraud offenses).
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etc.).  How, where, and in what form have we established such a doc-
trine as it relates to information?
This section of the discussion has led to some disturbing conclu-
sions.  Specifically, in the absence of solid answers to the two seminal
questions, it appears that it is not possible to create any meaningful
I&W regime for national information protection under the purview
of any organization or group of organizations.  Further, formulating
such answers seems to fall outside the bounds of competence or
authority of any current government organization.
At its core, this gloomy projection rests upon the impression that
the development of an I&W effort broadly embracing domestic equi-
ties would most probably require a greater degree of visibilty into the
details of the civil information base than has ever been maintained.
Not surprisingly, the commercial stakeholders have been reluctant to
provide such unconstrained access; the government has not made a
case for its right to demand it, nor has the government yet
demonstrated the compelling need to stimulate voluntary participa-
tion at the required level.  We need a new approach.
VIII.  DIGGING OUT OF THE HOLE
The required sense of need might emerge from one of only two
conditions: desperation or opportunity.  Desperation, or a clear and
present danger of real and truly painful losses due to information at-
tack, is the approach implicitly favored by those who constantly point
to threats of various kinds.96  Unfortunately, these marketing efforts
have only enjoyed limited success to date.97  Industrial leaders make
business-based decisions and take actions within their ability to pro-
tect themselves, consistent with their own sense of costs and bene-
fits.98  Even to this day, some business leaders remain skeptical about
the threat, and of the rest, a considerable fraction questions the
government’s ability to provide anything useful for them individually,
even if the government did have the benefit of full and timely knowl-
edge of industrial “information events.”99  The irony is that the skep-
tics may be correct, but for a different reason.  Without the needed
inputs to the I&W process, the output cannot be satisfactory.  In
other words, by their own actions (or inactions), industries can virtu-
96. See, e.g., THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PRO-
TECTION, supra note 17, at x.
97. See CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, supra note 41, at 4.
98. See id.
99. See id.
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ally guarantee that their assessment of governmental impotence will
become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  This leads us to explore the other
approach to breaking the information-sharing logjam: recognition of
opportunity for personal or organizational benefit.
IX.  ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST, AND THE
BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL INFORMATION POWER
The need exists to promote extensive information sharing and to
establish a beneficial role for government to justify industrial contri-
butions to that sharing.  Even more than that, however, we must re-
spond to the underlying opportunities and imperatives of the Infor-
mation Age at a strategic level.  This could all be achieved by the
creation of a national information regime which would go beyond
simply protection to some range of positive measures calculated to
enhance America’s informational position, at home and globally, on
a broad and sustained basis.
What is the practical value of America’s dominance in the global
market of informational goods and services?  What opportunities ex-
ist for a confluence of public and private interests?  What outcomes
strengthen those interests, both mutually and separately?  Detailed
answers to these questions lie outside the scope of this Article.  In
general, however, the intellectual objective can be captured in a sin-
gle sentence, from which all else can be logically extrapolated:
“What are the Vital National Interests of the United States in the In-
formation Age?”
Absent such an understanding and declaration, we cannot relia-
bly distinguish between individual violations, which may be resolved
by domestic processes of criminal and civil law enforcement, and
strategic threats to national security.  Even more important is the no-
tion that one should seek not just to protect one’s vital interests,
national or otherwise, but one should aspire to advance them as well.
This is where we move beyond the mechanistic deus ex machina of
dueling hardware and ascend to the level of strategic ideation (which
was the real objective from the beginning).
The answer to the above question offers, in principle, the first
practical path toward the universally acknowledged desired outcome.
A goal of fundamental information sharing on a basis of genuine
partnership and mutual benefit should achieve the advancement of
total national interests.  Any acceptable and comprehensive answer
to this question would necessarily engage the leading experts and
theorists of traditional national security, leading researchers and aca-
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demics of the scientific sector, and industrial and business leaders of
the information technology community.  Even at that stage, the an-
swer would only exist in draft form.  However, it could serve as a
point of departure for the necessarily very broad and very public de-
bate that must ensue.
Although it certainly need not be advertised nor conducted as
such, the debate would be tantamount to a public referendum on na-
tional security and the role of government for the foreseeable future,
a move that may well be overdue.  In an environment in which 59%
of the public lists as the biggest threat to the country in the future
“big government,” compared with “big business” at only twenty-five
percent,100 what are the people really saying?  It seems clear that
when any person or organization loses the approval and confidence
of his/her associates, there is a sense that one is no longer contribut-
ing anything of value to the relationship.  Why would anyone want to
maintain, much less expand, a relationship which provides no value?
When and if the people come to recognize and value the information
important to them in their daily lives, and government undertakes to
protect it with their support and cooperation, it will at least be a step
in the right direction.  One thing, at least, is quite obvious: unless and
until there is clear consensus on the first two questions on Figure
(1)—in other words, until our vital national informational interests
can be defined—effective I&W of attacks against those interests can-
not be achieved.  Such efforts will founder for lack of the needed in-
formation-sharing and dissemination agreements, plans, and proto-
cols.
It may be possible to see all this in a common context.  Fear of
big government and reluctance to share precious information with
that bogeyman are mutually supporting phenomena.  The inability of
government to relate to the needs and concerns of its leading eco-
nomic citizens—now and in future, the information technology sec-
tor—exacerbates the division between the public and private sectors,
further inhibiting meaningful communication.  The lack of communi-
cation increases the risk that the products and services government
provides will fall short of the perceived need, thus appearing to con-
firm the negative impressions held by its critics.
All those who share a belief in the potentially positive role of
good government,101 and have concerns for the growing needs, as well
100. American Values: Three Decades of Change, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 1998, at A18.
101. Which is not necessarily synonymous with “big government.”
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as unmet opportunities, of the Information Age, should see a logical
marriage of interests in the acknowledgement of national information
power as a component of America’s strength.
X.  CONCLUSION
The onus is initially on the government, as it must be.  In the
course of formulating its strategy for the Information Age, govern-
ment must make a convincing case for the informational input it re-
quires from private sources.  In so doing, government must not only
indicate what information it needs and how it intends to use that in-
formation, it must also demonstrate convincingly its appreciation for
the sensitivity of proprietary and personal information.  This level
playing field is needed to assuage the fears of those who might be
concerned about losing competitive advantage.  For the commercial
participants, this initiative should be framed not so much as a burden,
but rather as an opportunity to act in their own self-interest.  How-
ever, this will only be believed and acted upon once government
demonstrates it can and will be a wise steward of sensitive informa-
tion, as well as an effective advocate for industry’s needs.  In the
same spirit, government must be very thoughtful in selecting its
mouthpiece, the interface between the totality of the domestic econ-
omy and the entire breadth of government.  Selection of any nar-
rowly focused organization to perform this vital function would
clearly be unwise.
To build on the momentum of this expanded exchange of infor-
mation, and hopefully, of ideas and plans, we must pursue progress
toward framing the nation’s vital national informational interests as a
high priority.  It should be expected that this process will take time to
progress through several iterations in the course of its preparation.  It
will not be a project for the intellectually limited or the weak of
heart.
As the goals, priorities and concerns of the nation take shape on
paper and in circles of influence, the proper size and shape of the
government’s organizational response to those needs should become
visible concomitantly.  The model may turn out to resemble a combi-
nation of several existing departments into an enormous and far-
reaching single entity, as some leading thinkers have suggested.102  At
the other end of the scale, very loosely structured and adaptive vir-
102. See Stephen Cambone, A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning (visited
Mar. 1, 1999) <http://www.csis.org/pubs/newstructforwd.html>.
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tual organizations, themselves heavily based on information tech-
nologies, are being examined as a means to achieve advanced infor-
mation sharing and decision-aiding in response to crisis.103  Between
these approaches lies a range of other options.  One thing appears
clear, however: preservation of the status quo runs the risk of con-
tinuing the downward trends of the perceived value and relevance of
government in the eyes of the public since the 1960s.104
Another point that cannot be forgotten is that beyond providing
an optimally efficient interface for the receipt of private information,
the government’s organizational efforts must pay close attention to
the ways and means for it to disseminate relevant, timely and ulti-
mately valuable information to the society it exists to serve.  This
must occur not just in response to threat of attack, but in routine
maintenance of “information wellness,” to coin a phrase.  Without
that quid pro quo understanding, clearly established at the outset and
reinforced at every turn, there is no reason to believe any organiza-
tional model could hope to work.
Once again it must be pointed out that in the context of any
comprehensive national information strategy, we must seek opportu-
nities to project America’s informational power offshore in pursuit of
our vital national interests, informational and otherwise.  This is not a
veiled reference to offensive IW, but rather to the whole range of na-
tional policy influences available through technology transfer, export,
intergovernmental information-exchange agreements, trade policy,
and other means.  Declaratory policies will be needed to document
the status of the specified informational equities as being among our
vital national interests, and also to provide a visible strategic frame-
work to support the furtherance of America’s informational policies
and projects.
When all the foregoing has been achieved, or is at least well
along, we will have stepped up to full acknowledgement of that which
has at least implicitly been recognized already.  National information
power is a component of America’s national strength and a precious
resource to be protected as a vital national interest.  The opportunity
is before the government and the rest of the nation to recognize that
the character of the Information Age is so closely aligned with the
traditional strengths of the United States and its people, that it is as if
the new Age were made for us.  Ingenuity, initiative, imagination, in-
103. See Brian Sharkey, Project Genoa (visited Mar. 8, 1999) <http://dtsn.darpa.mil/iso/
programtemp.asp?mode=285>.
104. See American Values: Three Decades of Change, supra note 100.
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vention . . . these strengths abound in us as a people.  For better or
worse, the technologies spawned by their application will be a domi-
nant force in directing and pacing the progress of human civilization,
probably until long past the lifetime of anyone alive today.  If we are
to secure that future, and our place within it, the time to act is now,
not as “the government” or as “the information technology industry
sector,” but as a nation and a people.  The choice is ours, and the
clock is ticking.
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Author’s Note: The International Dimension
This Article attempts to identify and characterize a few of the
many important issues of the Information Age, focusing on the op-
portunities and imperatives for the United States.  To those readers
more accustomed to—and interested in—rich and rigorous debate of
the fine points of international law within these pages, I (a legal lay-
man) offer my apologies.  However, I would suggest that although
the emphasis of this Article is largely domestic, the nature of the
“information revolution” is such that an increasingly international
perspective is unavoidable.  By challenging traditional notions of ter-
ritoriality and sovereignty, the Information Age demands attention
by legal and public policy scholars.
What some might consider the over emphasis of domestic versus
foreign content of this piece does not reflect either disinterest or dis-
regard for international aspects of information attack and protection
on the part of the author or editors.  However, it must be said that to
date, the expenditures of intellectual and other forms of capital in
this area steeply favor the United States, notwithstanding the serious
efforts of some other nations at present to catch up.
Beyond the disclaimer above, in a journal such as this it is both
appropriate and necessary to provide at least an overview of the prin-
cipal issues guiding and pacing the international political and legal
debate in the field.  Accordingly, the following very cursory overview
is offered, in the hopes that it might serve as a primer for further
study, and perhaps also the outline of a future, rigorous treatment of
this crucial topic in the Duke Journal of Comparative & International
Law.
THE BIG PICTURE
Within the larger subject of “Information Warfare” (as devel-
oped in the accompanying article), practicable international coopera-
tion and agreement is most needed in four areas:105
1.  Application and/or adaptation of existing definitions, usages
and understandings of the material world into a newer,
“informational” format.106
105. This discussion is drawn generally from WALTER GARY SHARP, CYBERSPACE AND
THE USE OF FORCE (1999), LAWRENCE T. GREENBERG ET AL., INFORMATION WARFARE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988), THE WHITE HOUSE, A NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR
THE NEW CENTURY (1998), and the author’s personal experiences, including extensive negotia-
tions and coordination with foreign governments in this field.
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2.  Agreement on technical formats, standards, and protocols for
interoperability of Information Assurance technologies, to include
encryption.107
3.  Improved cooperation in detecting, investigating, and prose-
cuting information attackers across jurisdictional boundaries.108
4.  Some international players (or perhaps “wannabees”?) in the
IW world have advocated regulatory regimes of various kinds, in-
tended to limit or outlaw all types of information attack.109  The ques-
tion of whether it may or may not be in the best interests of the
United States to accede to these proposals lies outside the scope of
this paper.  We ignore such initiatives at our peril.  As such, we must
“engage” in this area, regardless of the outcome desired.
These few topics represent just the beginnings of the required ef-
fort and understanding in the international dimension of the nascent
field of “Information Warfare,” as practiced by many around the
globe, and in many guises.
106. One example of this is the need to reevaluate “force,” “armed attack,” and “self-
defense” as defined in the articles two and fifty-one of the United Nations Charter.  Sharp’s
book examines this particular question in detail.  See SHARP, supra note 105.
107. The encryption debate alone requires—and deserves—a small book to develop the
various positions adequately.  For our purposes here, suffice it to say that to date, no proposal
put forward in the international arena has achieved broad acceptance.  Therefore, the under-
lying protective regimes remain a patchwork of dissimilar and generally non-interoperable sys-
tems, providing uneven security.
108. This area of need has shown some, albeit limited, progress.  That is, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice is working with national and multi-national organizations.  See THE WHITE
HOUSE, supra note 105, at 16-18.  However, characteristics of the international extradition
process permit some states to shield apparently “private” individuals employed as state actors,
while in other cases, the portrayal of an information-attack prosecution as a “political crime” is
an effective block to extradition.  See United Nations Crime and Justice Information Network,
Model Treaty (visited April 24, 1999) <http://www.ifs.univie.ac.at:80/uncjin/unrule17.html>; see
also JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INFORMATION ASSURANCE: LEGAL, REGULATORY, POLICY AND
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS, 6-4 (3d ed. 1997).
109. See SHARP, supra note 105, at 5-6.

